I outline a microcircuit theory of somatosensory cortex as a body model serving both for body representation and ''body simulation.'' A modular model of innervated and non-innervated body parts resides in somatosensory cortical layer 4. This body model is continuously updated and compares to an avatar (an animatable puppet) rather than a mere sensory map. Superficial layers provide context and store sensory memories, whereas layer 5 provides motor output and stores motor memories. I predict that layer-6-to-layer-4 inputs initiate body simulations allowing rehearsal and risk assessment of difficult actions, such as jumps.
I outline a microcircuit theory of somatosensory cortex as a body model serving both for body representation and ''body simulation.'' A modular model of innervated and non-innervated body parts resides in somatosensory cortical layer 4. This body model is continuously updated and compares to an avatar (an animatable puppet) rather than a mere sensory map. Superficial layers provide context and store sensory memories, whereas layer 5 provides motor output and stores motor memories. I predict that layer-6-to-layer-4 inputs initiate body simulations allowing rehearsal and risk assessment of difficult actions, such as jumps.
Body Model Theory I outline a theory on the function and neural computations taking place in somatosensory cortex. Somatosensory cortex is a large cortical area found in all mammals and is distinguished by an immensely complex layer 4 ( Figure 1A ). The theory outlined applies to the mammalian somatosensory cortex in general, whereby many of the examples cited here come from rodent research.
According to the body model theory introduced here, the somatosensory cortex fulfills two major computational tasks ( Figure 1B ). The first computational task is to generate a body model that resides in layer 4 of somatosensory cortex. This body model originates from a generative operation, in which a body model is constructed based on genetic information as well as inputs from somatosensory afferents and other sensory modalities. Thus, rather than assuming that the body representation arises as a passive imprint of somatosensory afferents, I suggest an ongoing ''embodiment operation,'' which generates a body model in layer 4. The neural structure of this model will be discussed below.
The second computational task of the somatosensory cortex is to run ''body simulations.'' Thus, I suggest that somatosensory cortex offers a similar functionality for the body as a flight simulator can offer for an airplane. Body simulations can either be employed for mental preparation/rehearsal of body actions or be used to generate adaptive behavior by mental evaluation of different body actions. This idea that mental simulations could be used to evaluate behavioral choices was also envisioned by Dennett (2008) . As Dennett points out, the brain's capacity to generate an inner environment endows animals and humans with an ability to simulate actions and their consequences. As detailed below, I suggest that body simulations involve an interaction of multiple cortical layers. Specifically, I hypothesize that body simulations come about by ''animating'' the layer 4 body model under the command of layer 6 inputs in a sensory world provided by the superficial cortical layers.
The distinguishing feature that sets apart somatosensory cortex from early subcortical processing stations is that it represents somatosensory information in an animatable body model. Accordingly, I predict that damage to somatosensory cortex will be detrimental in tasks that require a body model, whereas such damage will not impact simple sensory tasks, which can be solved subcortically. According to the view outlined here, the somatosensory cortex is primarily concerned with the ''body'' and its relation to the world as opposed to pure sensing of the outside world.
The Standard Model: Somatosensory Cortex as a Sensory Map
The idea that sensory cortices in general, and somatosensory cortex in particular ( Figure 1A ), operate as some kind of sensory map ( Figure 1C ) is a central assumption in much of sensory neuroscience and is often treated as a fact rather than a hypothesis. This idea often comes along with feedforward models of cortical processing that emphasize the sequential response elaboration across sensory processing stations, as described by Hubel and Wiesel for the visual system (Hubel and Wiesel, 1977) . Under this framework, response elaboration from peripheral to cortical sensory responses is the key functional property of cortical cells. Accordingly, somatosensory cortex is viewed as a purely sensory structure and most experimental work on somatosensory cortex involves sensory stimuli. Most accounts of processing in somatosensory cortex focus on the acquisition and transformation of sensory signals from external environment (Simons, 1995; Petersen, 2003) . The emphasis on sensory processing has overshadowed the tight link between somatosensory and motor processing, and left the motor properties of somatosensory cortices unattended, even though stimulation experiments have consistently documented such motor functions (Woolsey, 1952; Gioanni and Lamarche, 1985; Matyas et al., 2010) .
A Critique of the Sensory Map Hypothesis
Conceptual Issues Sensory map theory suffers from four profound conceptual problems. The first is one I refer to as body naiveté . Accordingly, it is assumed that the body emerges from afferent information relayed by the afferent map; i.e., the body is viewed as something given. In contrast, body model theory holds that the body is not a given and that the computation of a body model (as opposed to sensing extracorporeal sensory stimuli) is the central problem that somatosensory cortex is concerned with. The second conceptual problem of sensory map theory is its excessive focus on extero-sensing, i.e., the sensing of extracorporeal stimuli. Almost all studies on somatosensory cortex apply such stimuli. Further, almost all studies on primate somatosensory cortex analyze area 3b, which is thought to carry cutaneous signals. Areas 3a, 1, and 2, on the other hand, which carry deep inputs and joint information, are barely studied. Importantly, the few studies that assessed the role of proprioceptive inputs in the somatosensory cortex observed prominent proprioceptive signals in behaving animals (Prud'homme and Kalaska, 1994) . I suggest that the excessive emphasis of sensory map theory on extero-sensing impedes the study of the areas that seem to be concerned with body-related signals, i.e., entero-sensing. A third major conceptual problem of the sensory map theory is the lack of a metaphor for thought. Sensory map theory is essentially a feedforward theory of sensory processing. While such theories can account for sensory performance, it is largely unclear how the relay of sensory information could contribute to mental operations like thought. The body model theory offers a clear metaphor for thought, i.e., ''body simulations'' equal to thoughts about bodily actions. The fourth problem of the sensory map theory is the lack of distinction between body and sensing. How the lack of this distinction blurs our ideas about tactile memory formation will be discussed below.
Lesion Evidence
The key prediction of the sensory map theory of somatosensory cortex is that lesions should result in somatosensory sensing deficits. The support for this prediction is mixed at best. For example, rats succeed in whisker-sensing tasks after lesions to barrel cortex (Hutson and Masterton, 1986) . Rats fail, however, in tasks that require the incorporation of knowledge about the body; i.e., they can no longer master a whisker-dependent gap-crossing task (Hutson and Masterton, 1986) . According to the body model theory, layer 4 barrels are ''whisker models'' and the gap-crossing deficit reflects a lack of this cortical ''whisker model.'' Much more stunning than those sensing deficits is the persistence of body model after peripheral lesions (i.e., phantom limbs), a result strange enough that Descartes included it as reason for his epistemological skepticism (Descartes et al., 1985) . Phantom limbs powerfully demonstrate the brain's capacity to generate body models even in the absence of the respective sensory nerve endings. Finally, the deficits following lesions to somatosensory cortex and adjacent parietal cortex provide strong indications that somatosensory cortex and adjacent parietal cortex are involved in generating a body model. In particular, the startling failure of such patients to recognize limbs as their own points a role of parietal cortex in generating a body model and ownership of limbs (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009; Sacks, 1998) . I conclude that evidence from peripheral and central lesion studies implicates the somatosensory cortex in the generation of a body model. Anatomical Evidence At first glance, the sensory map hypothesis of somatosensory cortex appears well aligned with the current views of the anatomy of the somatosensory system. It is generally agreed upon that sensory information is relayed via thalamus into layer 4 of somatosensory cortex, where the body is represented in a 2D map-like fashion ( Figure 1A ). According to the map hypothesis, the structure layer 4 is a reflection of sensory inputs, and the elaborate structure of the layer is a byproduct of sensory mapping. The body model theory, on the other hand, promotes an alternative view of the cortical anatomy. I suggest that layer 4 is not adequately described as a sensory relay center and the structure of layer 4 is not simply dictated by sensory input. Instead, I suggest that layer 4 is the anatomical manifestation of a body model, which in turn explains the immensely elaborate architecture of layer 4 ( Figure 1A ). Indeed, there is support by quantitative anatomy that layer 4 structure is dictated by the functional significance of body parts (i.e., by the body model) rather than by afferent architecture as predicted by the sensory mapping view. The work of Catania and colleagues provided very detailed behavioral and quantitative anatomical information (A) Tangential section through a flattened rat cortical hemisphere that has been stained with antibodies (green fluorescence) against vesicular glutamate transporter-2 (VGlut-2). VGlut-2 visualizes thalamic afferents, thus highlighting sensory areas (somatosensory cortex, S1; auditory cortex, A1; visual cortex, V1). S1 stands out due to its large size and immensely elaborate layer 4 microstructure, which captures even minute details of the body. (B) The body model theory suggests that somatosensory cortex is primarily concerned with generating a body model (lower), which can be used to run simulations (upper). (C) The sensory map theory suggests that somatosensory cortex is primarily concerned with sensing/stimuli.
for somatosensory system of a fascinating tactile specialist, the star-nosed mole. The star-nosed mole has eleven nose appendages, which are represented in a modular fashion in layer 4. Some nose appendages are used more than others and form a tactile fovea (Catania and Remple, 2004) . Remarkably, the detailed quantification of the nose appendage afferents and the corresponding cortical layer 4 nose appendage modules revealed that the layout of layer 4 of the somatosensory cortex (i.e., the size of the representation of nose appendages) is not dictated by afferent numbers, but by the behavioral significance of the respective nose appendage (Catania and Kaas, 1997; Sawyer and Catania, 2016) . Physiology A key criticism of the standard sensory-map/response-elaboration views of somatosensory cortex is an apparent lack of response elaboration in the somatosensory system. While there are clear differences and an increase in the complexity of response selectivity along the visual pathway, a similar response elaboration is not evident in the somatosensory system. Specifically, receptive fields increase somewhat in size proceeding from the thalamus (Brecht and Sakmann, 2002a) , to cortical layer 4 (Brecht and Sakmann, 2002b) , to supragranular layers (Brecht et al., 2003) and infragranular layers (Manns et al., 2004) ; however, there is no categorical difference between peripheral and cortical response selectivity in the somatosensory system. Memory An implication of the body model view of somatosensory cortex is that the body should also shape information storage. Indeed, data from rat somatosensory cortex strongly point to the existence of ''somatotopic memories.'' This conclusion was suggested by ''prosthetic whisker experiments'' (Harris et al., 1999) , in which a single whisker used in a gap crossing task by an otherwise whisker-trimmed animal was moved from whisker stub to whisker stub. Specifically, gap crossing memory transfer was quantitatively predicted by the layout of the barrel representation.
Related Theories: Hippocampal Simulation and Predictive Coding
The ideas laid out here for the somatosensory cortex are not novel in brain research. Hesslow (2002) expressed conceptually similar ideas on simulation in the sensory system. Different from the account given here, though, Hesslow did not formulate his ideas about perceptual simulations in terms of microcircuits. Similarly, in the motor system there is a long tradition of thinking about motor imagery and simulation (Jeannerod, 2001) . Similarly, the classic vehicle book of Braitenberg featured the idea that cell assemblies could carry out mental simulations (Braitenberg, 1986 ). In the specific context of dance, such views have also been raised (Cross et al., 2006) . Many of the ideas about the functionality of hippocampal replay and preplay evolved from similar assumptions and have inspired many of the ideas presented here. Specifically, hippocampal replay is thought to reflect the ability of hippocampal circuits to intrinsically reactivate past memories (Wilson and McNaughton, 1994; Lee and Wilson, 2002) . Such replay activity could fulfill the core computational needs required for body simulation. Several authors have detected hippocampal preplay sequences that were predictive of goal-directed behaviors (Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013) . Such findings are similar to the mental body simulations that I expect to precede difficult body acts. The idea that difficult and risky body actions are preceded by body simulations in the somatosensory cortex is based on the following reasoning: (1) Simple body actions are instantly carried out and do not require an intact somatosensory cortex. (2) It is obvious that body simulations (which may potentially result in the avoidance of that behavior) carry the biggest benefit. (3) Behaviorally, it appears that risky body behaviors such as jumps are often not instantly carried out and that animals and humans mentally evaluate such behaviors prior to execution. Finally, I expect cortical body simulation to be neurally more complex than hippocampal events, which originate in a simple three-layered network. Specifically, hippocampal replay events appear as simple repeats of prior experience, whereas cortical simulation events, as envisioned here, would presumably engage both similar (i.e., layer 4) and different (i.e., layer 6, as detailed below) circuits compared to the sensory experience.
Cognitive Modeling versus Predictive Coding
Predictive coding is a concept related to the ideas laid out here. Specifically, the present suggestion is that incoming sensory input is compared against an internally generated expectation in order to encode sensory events efficiently (Shipp et al., 2013) . It is perfectly reasonable to assume that the body model suggested here encodes this prediction. Similarly, it has been suggested that other brain structures such as the cerebellum optimize behavior by predicting the outcome of motor actions (Bastian, 2006) . Specifically, it was suggested that the cerebellum is of particular significance for forms of predictive motor control. The functions of the body model in body simulation suggested here, however, go well beyond mere prediction in motor control. What I suggest is a type of cognitive modeling in which different options of body actions are mentally evaluated. Thus, the type of modeling envisioned for somatosensory cortex serves for action selection rather than for efficient coding, as in Friston's ideas, or for improving motor performance, as in cerebellar predictive coding.
Neural Implementation of the Body Model Theory
The Layer 4 Body Model and Body Memories What Type of Body Model Are We Talking About? The body model envisioned here is represented in layer 4 of primary somatosensory cortex and is a detailed low-level model of the body (Figure 2A) . A key feature of this model that distinguishes it from the sensory sheet-like idea implied in the sensory map hypothesis is that it can be animated, i.e., it can walk, smile, and act. The ability of the model to generate neural patterns equivalent to body actions stems from the genetically determined connectivity of somatosensory cortex and from experience. Thus, I imagine that layer 4 circuits have the ability to record and replay neural patterns associated with body actions. Hence, layer 4 can be thought of as the storage site for body memories ( Figure 2B ). As a result of genetics and experience, layer 4 circuits will be able to generate the concerted activity patterns in lip muscles, cheek muscles, lip skin, and facial skin that are associated with a smile; other actions can be animated in an equivalent fashion. In consequence, layer 4 can be thought of as a Pinocchio-like puppet or an avatar, but not like a mere sensory map. Primate primary somatosensory cortex contains not one but four somatosensory areas (area 3a, area 3b, area 2, and area 1). I expect that each of these areas generates a slightly different body model-a more cutaneous one in area 3b and a more muscle-oriented one in area 1-but that activity in these areas is tightly coordinated. The Neural Structure of the Layer 4 Body Model. It is visually evident that layer 4 of somatosensory cortex is distinct and more complex than the neural structure of basically all other cortical areas ( Figure 1A ). I suggest that two major factors determine the neural structure of layer 4. (1) The layer 4 body model is modular (Woolsey and Van der Loos, 1970) . I suggest a module is defined by a consistent scaling within the module, whereas different modules can have different scaling. I expect that such modules are building blocks of all neural operations in layer 4 of somatosensory cortex, i.e., whereas different modules may participate differentially in neural simulations, all neurons within a module will participate in the same fashion. (2) The second defining feature of layer 4 in somatosensory cortex is that it uses a place code for body locations. This appears to be a fundamental principle of layer 4 organization in somatosensory cortex and is the reason why we see a reflection of the body in section through layer 4 ( Figure 1A ). These two factors shape to a modular model of the body in layer 4, in which the location of a neuron in layer 4 unambiguously determines the body location represented. An Ongoing Embodiment Operation. I suggest an ongoing ''embodiment operation,'' which updates the modular layer 4 body model, and predict that changes to the body will result in major layer 4 rewiring. This embodiment operation constantly matches the layer 4 microcircuits to the body, such that nail growth changes the layer 4 finger isomorph in the (D) Thalamocortical response transformation. Afferent activity-in this example, afferent input from afferents innervating the base of the fingernail-is recoded into place code for body locations, in this case a sharp stimulus at the tip of the nail. I also indicate here that sensory memory is thought to be stored in layer 2/3. (E) Body simulation. While the actual hand is stretched out, layer 6 inputs to layer 4 initiate a simulation of a thumbs up gesture. (F) ''Behaving as if'' is an acted out body simulation. An aversive stimulus (hand of disliked person) is responded to with a friendly gesture (a handshake). In this case, layer 6 inputs to layer 4 instruct a friendly gesture and overwrite the evidence from sensory inputs coming from the periphery and the sensory memories coming from layer 2/3. This ''simulation'' is then relayed from layer 4 to layer 5 to act out the friendly gesture. somatosensory cortex ( Figure 2C ). This embodiment operation acts on slow timescales. As already pointed out above, embodiment is not restricted to innervated structures, but it will include inputs that are in fixed relation to the body. This way, I imagine, we incorporate glasses, rings, and the like into layer 4 of our somatosensory cortex. Thalamocortical Response Transformations. A major puzzle in the somatosensory system is that thalamic and cortical layer responses appear in many ways similar Sakmann, 2002a, 2002b) , rather than distinct, as in the visual system (Hubel and Wiesel, 1977) . The body model theory suggests that there is a major response transformation at the thalamocortical synapse ( Figure 2D ). I suggest that this response transformation has not been fully realized because it is not an analytic operation concerned with stimulus selectivity as observed in the visual system. Instead, I predict it is a generative operation, where afferent information is used to recover the structure of the body. Specifically, I envision that at the thalamocortical synapse, inputs are transformed from afferent activity to a place code for body locations ( Figure 2D ). I predict that this body representation also encompasses non-innervated body parts. Hence, somatosensory cortex represents the body and not just afferents. In contrast to what one expects based on a simple relaying of sensory information, I predict that as a result of the embodiment operation, layer 4 contains a richer picture of the body than thalamic afferents. Thus, I assume that layer 4 of somatosensory cortex contains an explicit representation of the fingernail even though this is not an innervated body part ( Figure 2D) . Similarly, I predict that the somatosensory cortex will also contain an explicit representation of body cavities such as the nostril because such cavities are important parts of the body despite the lack of innervation. Thus, thalamocortical response transformation corresponds to a projection of afferent information onto a layer 4 modular body model.
Columnar Organization of Somatosensory Cortex and Sensory-Motor Memories
Columnar Organization Layer 4 of somatosensory cortex does not act alone, but operates embedded in a columnar network. The way that layersother than layer 4-contribute to somatosensory function is less clear, but envisioning a more complete picture of cortical operations might be helpful to understand columnar operations of somatosensory cortex.
The Function of Layer 5
Layer 5 is one of the most studied cortical layers. Unlike layer 4, it has a non-modular organization. Layer 5 of somatosensory cortex has motor properties, and I assume that it is involved in putting body model computations into action. In line with this, the deep layers receive massive input from motor cortices. Thus, I predict that layer 5 is the storage site for somatosensory motor memories ( Figure 2B) . A motor function of layer 5 has been proposed by various previous authors, including Guillery and Sherman (2002) . The Function of the Superficial Layers Cells in these layers show a much more pronounced and faster plasticity than layer 4 cells (Feldman and Brecht, 2005; Diamond et al., 1994) . I suggest that these neurons are involved in sensory memory formation. Thus, the body model theory assumes a fundamental dichotomy between slowly changing body memories stored in layer 4 and sensory memories rapidly stored in layer 2/3 ( Figure 2B ). Superficial layers receive diverse inputs and distribute massive cortico-cortical outputs and hence might represent the sensory context in which the body operates. Superficial layers might also be involved in broadcasting the results of body model computations. A body model in isolation is of little use and sensory inputs from other cortical areas will be critical input for most mental operations performed by the body model. Much like layer 5, superficial layers operate in a nonmodular fashion. Accordingly, in barrel cortex both layer 5 motor memories (about whisker movements) and superficial layer sensory memories (about whisker contacts) will be much more distributed and continuously represented than the body memories (such as knowing whisker length) stored in layer 4 barrels. Laminar Organization and Map Plasticity A key element of the hypothesis is that cortical layers act and change in more distinct ways from one another as they harbor different memories ( Figure 2B ). Major changes to somatosensory cortical circuits have been documented in the context of map plasticity (Buonomano and Merzenich, 1998) . In line with the idea that the embodiment operation, which shapes the layer 4 body model, operates on slow timescales, whereas sensory memories are laid down in layer 2/3 instantly, I predict that distinct learning rules and neuromodulator contingencies (Weiss et al., 2000) will apply across different laminae. Indeed, there is some scattered evidence that synaptic plasticity rules differ between layer 4 (Egger et al., 1999) and layer 5 (Markram et al., 1997) .
The Neural Implementation of Body Simulation/Thought Simulation According to the body model theory, body simulation is the key functionality added by the somatosensory cortex. Body simulation is a neural operation not supported by subcortical processing ( Figures 1B and 2E) . In body simulations, layer 4 activity patterns dissociate from actual body posture ( Figure 2E ). Through body simulations, somatosensory cortex endows mammals with an ''inner life,'' so to speak, in the context of body sensations and actions. According to the body model theory, body simulation is the neural equivalent to thought about the body. While there is little ''inner/mental'' life/dynamics in somatosensory cortical circuits according to the feedforward processing models like the sensory map hypothesis, body simulations allow thought-about body actions. According to this idea, the somatosensory cortex functions for the body much like a flight simulator acts for airplanes ( Figure 1B) . I expect such body simulations to occur with varying degrees of completeness and intensity. One might expect the most complex simulations prior to the performance of challenging motor acts. Specifically, I predict body simulations prior to jumps, beam walking, etc. Body simulations have their biggest adaptive value prior to first-time difficult motor acts. Simple acts do not need mental evaluation, and in repeated acts, information gained from experience outweighs the advantages of mental evaluation. Body simulations offer two immediate advantages: first, mental evaluation, and second, mental practice. At least in humans, it seems likely that we also use our body model in somatosensory cortex in social contexts for modeling other people (Keysers et al., 2010; Adolphs et al., 2000) . Another instance where body simulations might play a major role is anticipated body contacts in the context of tickling and play behaviors. Thus, when rats are tickled or when they play chasing games with a human hand, one observes strong activation of somatosensory cortex even outside of touch periods (Ishiyama and Brecht, 2016) . Given the absence of touch, I suggest such somatosensory cortical activity reflects body simulations of playful or tickling body contacts. Implementation of Body Simulations How body simulations are implemented by somatosensory cortical circuits is less clear. As alluded to earlier, I envision layer 4 to be the proper body model, but simulations must be initiated from internal inputs. Layer 6 receives massive feedback inputs, and layer 6 inputs to layer 4 are prime candidates for the initiation of simulations (Figure 2A ). Specifically, it is the case that socalled cortico-cortical layer 6 cells show significant axonal branching in layer 4, one of the few translaminar excitatory inputs into this layer (Narayanan et al., 2015) . Body simulations require detailed knowledge about the body; this information is presumably derived from body experience from prior actions. I assume that such knowledge about the body, i.e., a basic awareness of the own body, is similar across mammalian species. Thus, I expect that somatosensory cortex has the ability to record body-related activity, as well as replay chunks of such neural sequences as part of body simulations in novel contexts. ''Behaving As If'' Body simulations imply the decoupling of cortical activity and sensory input. When simulations are used to drive behavior, such decoupling opens the possibility for novel behavioral capacities. ''Behaving as if'' is a mode of action ( Figure 2F ) that is unthinkable without a body simulator. ''Behaving as if'' is a common mode of behavior without which mammalian and, in particular, human behavior is unthinkable. Interacting in a friendly manner with an annoying person, deceit, and all kinds of acting require such operations. In terms of microcircuits, I predict that such behaviors involve a partial suppression of thalamic inputs, the initiation (possibly by layer 6 inputs) of a simulation in layer 4, and drive from layer 4 to layer 5 to act out the simulation ( Figure 2F ).
Horizontal Connectivity of Somatosensory Circuits and the Body Model
So far, our microcircuit considerations focused on the laminar structure of cortex. It is clear, however, that horizontal connectivity within somatosensory cortex is an equally important constraint on the cortical body model. Specifically, it is plausible to assume that the massive horizontal connections are plastic and learn about possible body actions and the associated body contacts from patterns of coactivity in the cortical network. The ability of horizontal connections to reactivate such cortical patterns is the basis of memory-based body simulations. I expect horizontal connectivity imposes three constraints: (1) Modularity. The connectivity of somatosensory cortex is conspicuously modular ( Figure 1A) . Hence, we do not expect that cortical activity patterns map in a continuous fashion onto the cortical sheet. Thus, we predict that the sharp borders between different body parts will constrain cortical body simulation and that body parts will join body simulation in an all-or-none fashion. (2) Anisotropic horizontal connectivity within somatosensory cortex. Beyond modularity, connectivity within somatosensory cortex shows further anisotropies. For example, in barrel cortex there is a pronounced tendency for a preferential connectivity between barrel columns of a whisker row (Bernardo et al., 1990 ). As noted above, such connectivity might be in place to capture (and replay) natural cortical activity patterns, as whiskers of a whisker row tend to move together. (3) Multisensory integration and proximity to other areas. It is important to understand that cortical body simulations do not occur in isolation but in the context of imagined sensory and motor events. In this context, it is noteworthy that the somatosensory map is carefully arranged, such that the body parts are mapped in the proximity of cortical areas that represent the appropriate sensory and motor context. Thus, the somatosensory tongue representation is in direct proximity to gustatory cortex, the somatosensory eye and ear representation are in direct proximity to visual and auditory cortex, and the somatosensory forepaw representation is in direct proximity to forepaw motor cortex. Sheer horizontal proximity can therefore contribute to meaningful multisensory coactivity patterns.
Body Ownership Illusions as a Reflection of Body Simulations
Is somatosensory cortex a sensory map or an animatable avatar? Here I will discuss a set of body illusions that in my view prominently support the idea that illusory body perceptions are associated with activation of somatosensory cortex in a fashion consistent with body simulation. The specific illusion I am referring to is the so-called rubber hand illusion, where subjects view a rubber hand that is synchronously touched and positioned close to the subject's occluded hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) . Under such circumstance, subjects experience the rubber hand as their own hand, a profound misperception of body ownership. Such ownership illusions are not restricted to hands, but instead can extend to the whole body (Petkova et al., 2011) . Such misperceptions are not restricted to humans; evidence for ''rubber arms'' has also been obtained in monkeys (Shokur et al., 2013) , and a recent study reported a ''rubber tail illusion'' even in mice (Wada et al., 2016) . The similarity of body illusions across species supports a similarity of body awareness across mammals. What is most interesting in the context of this paper is that electrophysiological data from monkeys indeed indicate that such ownership illusion can lead to an ''illusory'' visual activation of somatosensory cortex (Shokur et al., 2013) . These observations suggest that there are visual pathways that can gain access to drive somatosensory cortex, if their visual interpretation is consistent with visual touch of the hand. The rubber hand illusion challenges the naive view that body perception is something given by somatosensory afferents. Instead, the data suggest body perception is dynamical and depends on the multisensory interpretation of the world. Specifically, I suggest that the ability to mentally emulate the rubber hand as your hand is a reflection of the brain's capacity to flexibly combine visual stimuli and simulated body actions. Virtual reality approaches have also demonstrated that our body scheme can be powerfully extended into virtual realities (Perez-Marcos et al., 2009) . Such extensions of the body scheme into a virtual world can lead to cognitive alterations in the perception of the real world, for example, altered perception of race (Maister et al., 2015) . These findings reiterate the idea that we use a mental body model in social contexts for modeling other people.
Predictions
Because the body model theory outlined here is formulated at the microcircuit level, it allows many predictions concerning (1) anatomy, (2) physiology, and (3) lesion effects of somatosensory cortex.
The body model theory predicts that layer 4 of somatosensory cortex will structurally mirror the entire body and not just sensory afferents. Thus, we will find cortical representations of body cavities, nails, and the like are not directly innervated. I suggest that the body model is continuously updated by a cortical ''embodiment operation,'' which matches layer 4 structure and modularity to body structure. I predict that changes to the body will result in much more dramatic changes to layer 4 (the neural correlate of the body model) than other forms of sensory experience such as sensory learning of stimulus properties.
The body model theory predicts prominent body simulationrelated activity. Contrary to the assumptions of feedforward sensory map model, I expect body simulation-related activity to feature prominently in layer 4. As alluded to above, I expect such simulation activity more often with increasing task difficulty of body acts, with increasing importance, and with risks that are associated with body acts, and I expect such simulation activity more often for body acts that have not been exercised before.
I expect lesion effects in somatosensory cortex to be subtle on the simple sensing level and to be profound when it comes to thoughts about the body and the availability of a correct body model.
Interference with somatosensory cortex should affect the strength and vividness of body ownership perceptions, such as the rubber hand illusion.
